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HOW THE GUN CONTROL ACT DISARMS BLACK
FIREARM OWNERS
Maya Itah
Abstract: Through 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the Gun Control Act (GCA) outlaws the possession
of a firearm “in furtherance of” a drug trafficking crime. The statute’s language is broad, and
federal courts have interpreted it expansively. By giving prosecutors wide discretion in
charging individuals with § 924(c) violations, the language enables the disproportionate
incarceration of Black firearm owners.
This Comment addresses this issue in three parts. Part I discusses the ways early gun
control laws overtly disarmed Black firearm owners. Additionally, Part I provides context for
the passage of the Gun Control Act of 1968, which coincided with the backlash to the Civil
Rights Movement. Next, Part II outlines the ways different circuits have interpreted § 924(c),
demonstrating how those interpretations disadvantage Black defendants. Finally, Part III puts
forth two proposals for reform: interpreting § 924(c) more narrowly, or simply removing the
language at issue from the GCA. These reforms would reduce racial disparities in the
enforcement of § 924(c). They would also reaffirm the right of Black Americans to keep and
bear arms for self-defense.

INTRODUCTION
Two contrasting cases—the first involving a Black defendant, and the
second involving a white defendant—illustrate the racially disparate
application of the Gun Control Act (GCA).1 In the first case, United States
v. Bell,2 officers in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, forced their way into Reecie
Humphrey’s home, breaking down her door with a battering ram.3 The
officers charged into a bedroom and found two people naked and asleep:
Ms. Humphrey herself, and Pierre Bell, her partner.4 As soon as Ms.
Humphrey and Mr. Bell put on clothes, the officers arrested them both.5



J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2022. The author worked on an
appeal of a § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) conviction as a summer intern. I want to thank Dennis Carroll and the
rest of the team at the Federal Public Defender for the Western District of Washington for helping me
come up with the idea for this piece. I also want to thank Professor Mary D. Fan for helping me turn
that idea into a full-fledged Comment, and my colleagues at Washington Law Review—especially
Celeste Ajayi, Luke Sturgeon, and Caroline Sung—for their insightful edits. Finally, I want to thank
my family and friends for all their support.
1. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–28).
2. 477 F.3d 607 (8th Cir. 2007).
3. Id. at 610; Brief for Appellant at 5, Bell, 477 F.3d 607 (No. 06-2802).
4. Brief for Appellant at 5, Bell, 477 F.3d 607 (No. 06-2802).
5. Bell, 477 F.3d at 610.
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When the officers searched the bedroom, they identified two things that
ultimately landed Mr. Bell in federal prison.6 First, they found a wallet
containing Mr. Bell’s identification card and roughly seven grams of
crack cocaine.7 Second, they uncovered a handgun buried “between the
mattresses on [Mr.] Bell’s side of the bed.”8
The prosecution charged Mr. Bell with possessing crack cocaine with
intent to distribute, possessing a firearm as a person with a felony
conviction, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime.9 He went to trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas.10 During the trial, Arkansas State Police Sergeant
Don Sanders testified that the amount of crack cocaine in the wallet
suggested that Mr. Bell was trafficking drugs, and that “drug dealers
commonly possess firearms to protect themselves, their illegal goods, and
their illegal proceeds.”11
A jury convicted Mr. Bell of all three counts.12 For possessing a firearm
in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, the court sentenced Mr. Bell, a
Black man in his thirties,13 to sixty months of incarceration14—the
mandatory minimum.15 The court imposed this sentence on top of a 144month sentence for dealing drugs and a 120-month sentence for
possessing the firearm in the first place.16
On appeal, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals held that “[t]he evidence
6. Id. at 610–11.
7. Id. at 610.
8. Id. At a suppression hearing, Mr. Bell testified that officers held a machine gun to his head while
he was naked, assaulted him, threatened to tase him, and ignored his request to speak with his lawyer.
Ms. Humphrey testified that the handgun was actually hers, and that a police officer said her children
would be removed from her if she did not say that the drugs and gun belonged to Mr. Bell. The trial
court did not credit their testimony. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 4, at 5–7.
9. Bell, 477 F.3d at 609–10.
10. Id. at 607.
11. Id. at 611.
12. Id.
13. See Find an Inmate., FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/
[https://perma.cc/BQ9A-39GS] (select the “Find by Name” tab; then type “Pierre Bell” into the search
bar; then select “Search”).
14. Bell, 477 F.3d at 610.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). A mandatory minimum sentence is one the court must give a
defendant who violates a specific statute, regardless of the defendant’s personal circumstances or the
specific facts of the crime. See Sentencing 101, FAMM, https://famm.org/our-work/sentencingreform/sentencing-101/ [https://perma.cc/4UR4-YYZX].
16. Bell, 477 F.3d at 610. For a discussion of how criminalizing the possession of firearms by
people with felonies disparately impacts Black firearm owners, see generally Emma Luttrell
Shreefter, Federal Felon-in-Possession Gun Laws: Criminalizing a Status, Disparately Affecting
Black Defendants, and Continuing the Nation’s Centuries-Old Methods to Disarm Black
Communities, 21 CUNY L. REV. 143 (2018).
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was sufficient to support [Mr.] Bell’s conviction for possessing a firearm
in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).17 The
court noted that the officers who entered the bedroom “observed Bell
apparently reaching for the revolver” and that the gun was “proximately
located to” the crack cocaine.18 It reasoned that “[t]hese facts, while not
overwhelming, support an inference that Bell possessed the revolver in
furtherance of his possession with intent to distribute the crack cocaine.”19
The next case, United States v. Rockey,20 involves a white defendant. It
contrasts starkly with Mr. Bell’s case, illustrating the disparate impact of
§ 924(c) on Black firearm owners. Mr. Bell, who possessed a few grams
of crack while keeping a gun in the home where he slept, received the
same sentence for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime as William Eugene Rockey,21 a white man in his forties.22 Mr.
Rockey was driving down a highway in Oklahoma when a police officer
attempted to pull him over.23 In response, Mr. Rockey led the officer on a
high-speed chase.24 At one point, he stuck a handgun out the window and
fired two rounds.25 Mr. Rockey ended the chase by abandoning the truck
and fleeing into a nearby forest.26 Two days later, police found him in the
woods.27 Along with “a loaded Ruger Super Blackhawk .44 Magnum
affixed with a scope,” Mr. Rockey possessed a number of items useful for
manufacturing methamphetamine: lithium batteries, a syringe, iodine, and
ephedrine.28 Possessing ephedrine is illegal under the Controlled
Substances Act.29
Mr. Bell and Mr. Rockey engaged in plainly different courses of
conduct. Mr. Bell was asleep in his partner’s room, where a gun and a

17. Bell, 477 F.3d at 613; 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
18. Bell, 477 F.3d at 614.
19. Id.
20. 449 F.3d 1099 (10th Cir. 2006).
21. Id. at 1102. Given that Mr. Rockey discharged the firearm, it is unclear why he didn’t receive
a ten-year sentence instead. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) (“[A]ny person who . . . in furtherance
of [a drug trafficking crime], possesses a firearm, shall . . . if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years.”).
22. See Find an Inmate., FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/
[https://perma.cc/VNM4-U8VM] (select the “Find by Name” tab; then type “William Eugene Rocky”
into the search bar; then select “Search”).
23. Rockey, 449 F.3d at 1102.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1102–03.
29. Id. at 1103 (citing Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2)).
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small quantity of drugs were present; Mr. Rockey shot at officers, ran
from them, and had both a firearm and a controlled substance in his bag
when he was arrested. Together, these cases demonstrate two things about
§ 924(c). First, the statute criminalizes a wide range of conduct. The range
is so wide that it is hard to determine what generally ties § 924(c)
convictions together, beyond the existence of a defendant who possessed
drugs and a gun at the same point in time. Second, because of this range,
prosecutors have significant discretion in deciding which defendants to
charge with the crime. Why did Mr. Bell serve the same sentence as Mr.
Rockey? Unlike Mr. Bell, Mr. Rockey actually fired a handgun.30
Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of ten
years on defendants who discharge firearms,31 so the fact that both men
were sentenced to five years is particularly strange. Although the record
does not indicate what role race might have played in the prosecutors’
charging decisions, Mr. Bell’s Blackness likely accounts for the sentence
he received.32
This Comment explores how the federal courts’ broad interpretation of
§ 924(c) makes room for the disparate criminalization of gun ownership
by Black individuals. There are many cases like Mr. Bell’s: police find
drugs and a gun in the same room; at trial, an expert witness—typically a
member of law enforcement—testifies that drug dealers often own guns;
the jury convicts, and the defendant goes to prison. The defendant in
question is disproportionately likely to be Black.33 Along with a separate
term of imprisonment for selling drugs, that defendant will serve a
sentence of at least five years34 and become ineligible for legal gun
ownership.35
In establishing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)’s racially disparate impact, this
Comment begins by looking at the history of gun control in the United
States. Part I gives a brief overview of the ways gun control has disarmed
Black Americans, both directly and indirectly. It also contextualizes the
passage of the GCA, the first attempt at comprehensive federal gun
control and the source of § 924(c). A general analysis of the benefits and
drawbacks of gun control policies is beyond the scope of this Comment.
Rather than carrying out that analysis, Part I simply addresses the fact that,
historically, legislators have used gun control laws to prevent Black
30. Id.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii).
32. See infra Part II.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 150–53.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).
35. Id. § 922(g)(1) (forbidding people with felony convictions from possessing “in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition”).
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Americans from owning firearms. Part II discusses the ways federal
courts have interpreted § 924(c) in the last two decades, focusing on the
ways courts have dismissed Black defendants’ assertion of the right to
self-defense. Part III proposes two reforms that address the harm § 924(c)
imposes on Black firearm owners. The first reform is a narrower
interpretation of § 924(c) that focuses on whether the defendant had a
culpable mental state. This interpretation would reduce the disparate
impact of § 924(c) on Black individuals; along with curbing prosecutorial
discretion, it would give defenses rooted in the right to self-defense the
opportunity to succeed. The second reform is an outright repeal of the
language in § 924(c) that criminalizes possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.
I.

THE RACIST IMPACT OF GUN CONTROL IN THE UNITED
STATES

The GCA is racially neutral on its face, but it wreaks a racially
disproportionate impact.36 The GCA’s statement of purpose declares that
the Act supports “law enforcement officials in their fight against crime
and violence.”37 The Act also states that it does not punish “law-abiding
citizens” who use firearms for “hunting, trapshooting, target shooting,
personal protection, or any other lawful activity.”38 Nearly every type of
firearm use Congress explicitly endorsed involves shooting for sport, a
white-coded activity.39 Congress could have listed other purposes that
lack this strong association with white communities—for example, many
36. See infra text accompanying notes 150–53; see, e.g., Holloway v. United States, No. 01-CV1017, 2014 WL 1942923, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 14, 2014) (“Black men like Holloway have long been
disproportionately subjected to the ‘stacking’ of § 924(c) counts.” (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: OVERVIEW OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 363 (2011))); Angela R. Riley, Indians and Guns, 100 GEO. L.J. 1675,
1712 (2012) (“With political momentum for gun control heightened, in October 1968 the
President . . . signed into law the Gun Control Act of 1968, which . . . ‘represented a backlash against
armed [Black individuals] who were seen to be undermining social order.’” (quoting ADAM
WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA 247 (2011)));
David E. Patton, Criminal Justice Reform and Guns: The Irresistible Movement Meets the Immovable
Object, 69 EMORY L.J. 1011, 1013 (2020) (“In 2018, consistent with most years, approximately 72%
of people sentenced for federal firearm offenses were Black or [Latinx].”). See generally Shreefter,
supra note 16.
37. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 101, 82 Stat. 1213, 1213–14.
38. Id.
39. See Jay Mechling, Boy Scouts, the National Rifle Association, and the Domestication of Rifle
Shooting, 53 AM. STUD. 5, 23 (2014) (discussing the image of the wholesome white youth who
engages in target shooting); Louis Warren, Book Review, 89 J. AM. HIST. 621, 621 (2002) (reviewing
DANIEL JUSTIN HERMAN, HUNTING AND THE AMERICAN IMAGINATION (2001)) (“By the end of the
nineteenth century . . . white middle-class Americans turned to hunting to establish themselves as
natives in a country of new immigrants.”).
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people own guns because their jobs require them to carry firearms, or
because they inherited firearms from relatives40—but it did not.
Shining a light on the GCA’s historical context reveals why the Act
disproportionately punishes Black people for owning firearms. As former
professional basketball player Kareem Abdul-Jabbar recently wrote in the
Los Angeles Times, “Racism in America is like dust in the air. It seems
invisible—even if you’re choking on it—until you let the sun in.”41
This Part examines the GCA in view of the history of gun control. Laws
restricting firearm access have long targeted Black people and members
of other marginalized groups, first overtly and later covertly. Even if the
GCA’s drafters lacked the explicit intent to disarm Black people, the Act
ultimately achieved that same result.
A.

Direct Prohibition: From the Colonial Period to Dred Scott42

The link between firearm ownership and political power has English
roots. During the first half of the 1600s, the English monarchy frequently
restricted the use of firearms, fearing “the dangers associated with having
a large number of English commoners armed with handguns, muskets,
and pikes.”43 The fear of armed commoners persisted in the latter half of
the century. For example, a 1670 statute declared that “no person, other
than heirs of the nobility, could have a gun unless he owned land” of a
certain value.44 England’s population thus became “intimately familiar
with the capricious ways in which arms, political power, and selfdetermination might link together.”45 Later, in 1765, English jurist
William Blackstone “asserted that constitutional guarantees unsupported
by citizens’ private firearms are guarantees in name only.”46
Colonizers from England brought their beliefs about firearms to
America. They saw gun ownership as a necessary means for securing their
political freedoms as well as their homes.47 Thus, it is significant that, in

40. Guns, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx [https://perma.cc/952Z-PBYL].
41. Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, Opinion, Don’t Understand the Protests? What You’re Seeing Is People
Pushed
to
the
Edge,
L.A.
TIMES
(May
30,
2020,
7:29
PM),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-05-30/dont-understand-the-protests-what-youreseeing-is-people-pushed-to-the-edge (last visited Sept. 19, 2021).
42. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
43. DONALD J. CAMPBELL, AMERICA’S GUN WARS: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF GUN CONTROL IN
THE UNITED STATES 17 (2019).
44. Roy G. Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the Second
Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961, 970 (1975).
45. CAMPBELL, supra note 43, at 18.
46. Id. at 19 (citation omitted).
47. Id. at 20.
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1640, the Colony of Virginia passed a law excluding Black people from
owning guns—the first restrictive law of any kind concerning the
Colony’s Black population.48 Throughout the Colonies, similar laws
prevented Black people, free or enslaved, from possessing firearms.49
The founding of the United States did not change matters. Many states
made it illegal for Black people to possess firearms “in order to maintain
[them] in their servile status,”50 in spite of provisions in state constitutions
analogous to the Second Amendment,51 which states that “the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms[] shall not be infringed.”52 Representing the
United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roger Taney rationalized the
disarmament of Black people in Dred Scott v. Sandford.53 He wrote that
the slaveholding states would have never accepted a Constitution that
gave Black people citizenship, because such a document “would give
them the full liberty . . . to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and
to keep and carry arms wherever they went.”54
B.

Indirect Prohibition: Reconstruction and the Muzzling of the
Fourteenth Amendment

After the Civil War, the United States government gave Black
Americans citizenship by ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment.55 In
theory, Black citizens became white citizens’ political equals. In practice,
states found ways to continue denying Black people fundamental rights,
including the right to bear arms.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s framers intended it to secure a panoply
of rights, among them “an individual right to own and keep guns in one’s
home for self-protection.”56 The Framers of the Constitution likely
understood the Second Amendment as guaranteeing the rights of a
militia—comprising “the people” rather than professional soldiers—to

48. Stefan B. Tahmassebi, Gun Control and Racism, 2 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 67, 69 (1991); see
CAMPBELL, supra note 43, at 24.
49. See CAMPBELL, supra note 43, at 24.
50. Tahmassebi, supra note 48, at 67.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. II; Tahmassebi, supra note 48, at 67, 70. The Second Amendment did not
apply to the states until the Supreme Court so held in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742,
749 (2010).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
53. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
54. Id. at 417.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
56. Akhil Reed Amar, The Second Amendment: A Case Study in Constitutional Interpretation, 2001
UTAH L. REV. 889, 899.
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use firearms for the protection of the republic, fulfilling a duty akin to jury
service.57 However, the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers “significantly
recast the right to weapons.”58 In a sense, they agreed with Justice Taney
that citizenship implied the right to own a firearm for self-defense.59 They
saw the ability to keep a gun at home for self-defense as “a true ‘privilege’
or ‘immunity’ of citizens.”60 In particular, they felt that Black people
living in the South “could not always count on the local police to keep
white night-riders at bay,” and thus needed to be able to count on
themselves.61
However, the United States Supreme Court made no discernable effort
to reaffirm the vision of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers. In United
States v. Cruikshank,62 an 1875 case, the Court held that the Second
Amendment “has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national
government.”63 The facts of Cruikshank make the case worth scrutinizing
closely. In 1872, an election for the governor of Louisiana led to a “hotly
contested” split between the Republican and Democratic candidates.64
While both candidates claimed victory, a federal judge declared that the
Republican candidate won.65
Fearing that the Democrats—who were mostly former slave owners—
would nonetheless try to take control of the regional government, an allBlack militia seized the local courthouse in 1873.66 Thus began the Colfax
Massacre: a group of white men forced the Black militiamen to surrender

57. See Amar, supra note 56, at 892–94; see also Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second
Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 646–47 (1989) (“There is strong evidence that ‘militia’ refers to all
of the people, or at least of all of those treated as full citizens of the community.”).
58. Amar, supra note 56, at 898.
59. See id. at 900; see also Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of
the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 256 (1983) (explaining that “proscribing anti-gun
laws was expressly contemplated by the authors of the . . . fourteenth amendment”).
60. Amar, supra note 56, at 899 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
61. Id. at 899, 911.
62. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
63. Id. at 553; see also Leslie Friedman Goldstein, The Second Amendment, the Slaughter-House
Cases (1873), and United States v. Cruikshank (1876), 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 365, 369 (2008) (“In
Cruikshank the Court made explicit . . . that neither the First nor Second Amendments are
incorporated against the state governments as privileges or immunities of U.S. citizens.”).
64. Danny Lewis, The 1873 Colfax Massacre Crippled the Reconstruction Era, SMITHSONIAN
MAG.: SMART NEWS (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/1873-colfaxmassacre-crippled-reconstruction-180958746/ [https://perma.cc/922P-T8X9].
65. William Briggs & Jon Krakauer, Opinion, The Massacre that Emboldened White Supremacists,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/28/opinion/black-lives-civilrights.html [https://perma.cc/4HML-TTFR].
66. See Lewis, supra note 64.
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and then murdered an estimated 150 of them.67 Following the massacre,
the federal government convicted three of the white perpetrators68 under
the Enforcement Act of 1870,69 which made it illegal “to join in a
conspiracy to deprive any citizen of ‘a right or privilege . . . secured to
him by the Constitution.’”70 The indictment alleged that the perpetrators,
among other things, intended to prevent two Black citizens from
exercising the “right to keep and bear arms for a lawful purpose.”71 The
perpetrators challenged the indictment, and the United States Supreme
Court ultimately set the convictions aside.72 In its opinion, the Court
announced that the right to bear arms for a lawful purpose “is not a right
granted by the Constitution.”73 It reasoned that the Second Amendment
merely “declares that it shall not be infringed; but this, as has been seen,
means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress.”74
Cruikshank implicitly gave states permission to prevent Black people
from possessing firearms. As a result, Black people “were routinely
disarmed by Southern States after the Civil War.”75 States’ methods
included banning cheap handguns (“the only firearms the poverty-stricken
freedmen could afford”),76 imposing business or transaction taxes on
handguns, giving the police discretion over the granting of firearms
licenses, and simply continuing to enforce pre-emancipation statutes.77
The Court did not reverse its position on the Second Amendment until
2010, holding in McDonald v. City of Chicago78 that the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-defense is “among those
fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty”79 and “is
fully applicable to the States.”80 The United States Supreme Court’s
refusal to give the federal government greater power in enforcing civil
67. Id.
68. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 546; see Justice John Paul Stevens, Glittering Generalities and
Historical Myths, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 419, 423 (2013).
69. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140.
70. Martha T. McCluskey, Facing the Ghost of Cruikshank in Constitutional Law, 65 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 278, 281 (2015) (quoting Enforcement Act of 1870 § 6).
71. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 545 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. II).
72. Id. at 559.
73. Id. at 553.
74. Id.
75. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 614 (2008).
76. Tahmassebi, supra note 48, at 73.
77. See id. at 73–75; Stephen P. Halbrook, To Bear Arms for Self-Defense: A “Right of the People”
or a Privilege of the Few?, 21 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 46, 47 (2020).
78. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
79. Id. at 778.
80. Id. at 750.
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rights paved the way for the Jim Crow era and its attendant violence.81
C.

Federal Prohibition: The Twentieth Century and the Beginnings of
Federal Gun Control

In the early twentieth century, the Jim Crow era’s midpoint, widespread
racism and xenophobia led the Ku Klux Klan to surge in popularity.82
Klan members often furthered the practice of restricting Black people’s
access to guns.83 For example, in 1906, Mississippi passed a law
“requiring retailers to maintain records of all pistol and pistol ammunition
sales, and to make such available to authorities for inspection.”84 The
authorities in question often belonged to the Ku Klux Klan.85 Contrary to
conventional narratives about racism in the United States, the Klan’s
popularity was not limited to the South.86 The organization “was present
in force in southern New Jersey, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and
Oregon.”87 Public support for white supremacy and nationalism may
explain why “[a]ll of these states enacted either handgun permit laws or
laws barring alien handgun possession between 1913 and 1934.”88
General calls for gun control rose in tandem with the number of people
moving to cities and the number of people immigrating to the United
States. By the start of the 1920s, more than half of Americans lived in
cities, and many city residents had recently arrived in America.89
Significantly, the newcomers came mostly from Eastern and Southern
Europe and did not readily blend into America’s dominant culture,
defined by white, Protestant settlers from Western Europe.90 United States
citizens’ “free-floating fears and suspicions, in concert with the rampant
crime already prevalent, spurred significant numbers of city
dwellers . . . to question the ready availability of firearms in such high-

81. See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an AfroAmericanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 348–49 (1991); McCluskey, supra note 70, at 281.
82. See generally Joshua D. Rothman, When Bigotry Paraded Through the Streets, ATLANTIC
(Dec.
4,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/second-klan/509468/
[https://perma.cc/98KQ-7HRR] (discussing the Klan’s cultural and political prominence in the
1920s).
83. See Tahmassebi, supra note 48, at 71–76.
84. Shreefter, supra note 16, at 169 (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae Congress of Racial Equality
in Support of Respondent at *18, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290).
85. Id.
86. Tahmassebi, supra note 48, at 78.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. CAMPBELL, supra note 43, at 34–35.
90. See id. at 35.
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density environments proffering so much anonymity and easy mobility.”91
For example, the first person convicted under New York’s Sullivan Act
of 1911,92 which “mandated police-issued licenses for handguns and made
it a felony to carry an unlicensed concealed weapon,”93 was an Italian
worker who carried a firearm for self-defense.94 The judge sentenced him
to a year in prison.95 In doing so, he said, “[i]t is unfortunate that this is
the custom with you and your kind, and that fact, combined with your
irascible nature, furnishes much of the criminal business in this
country.”96
The idea that gun control reduces violent crime became “a basic theme”
among lawmakers who favored restrictions on the sale and ownership of
firearms.97 During the New Deal, when the federal government
implemented wide-reaching programs to alleviate the effects of the Great
Depression, people began “to think of crime control as a national problem
meriting substantial federal regulation.”98 Accordingly, lawmakers started
having the first serious discussions about federal firearms regulation.99
This period brought about the precursors to the GCA: the National
Firearms Act of 1934100 and the Federal Firearm Act of 1938.101 The
former taxed the manufacturing, selling, and transportation of certain
types of firearms; the latter went further, requiring firearm manufacturers,
importers, and dealers to obtain a federal license and prohibiting people
with felonies from purchasing guns.102 While the GCA repealed the
Federal Firearms Act in 1968, it reenacted many of its provisions.103
91. Id.
92. Sullivan Act of 1911, ch. 195, § 1, 1911 N.Y. Laws 442, 442.
93. Michael A. Walsh, The Strange Birth of NY’s Gun Laws, N.Y. POST (Jan. 16, 2012, 5:00 AM),
https://nypost.com/2012/01/16/the-strange-birth-of-nys-gun-laws/ [https://perma.cc/5VUL-QMC6].
94. CAMPBELL, supra note 43, at 32–33.
95. Id. at 33.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 41–42.
98. Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J. LEGAL
STUD. 133, 136 (1975).
99. Id. at 137.
100. Pub. L. No. 73-474, 48 Stat. 1236.
101. Pub. L. No. 75-785, 52 Stat. 1250; see also Zimring, supra note 98, at 138.
102. Sarah Gray, Here’s a Timeline of the Major Gun Control Laws in America, TIME (Apr. 30,
2019,
11:13
AM),
https://time.com/5169210/us-gun-control-laws-history-timeline/
[https://perma.cc/8USP-66U4].
103. Id.; see also MICHAEL A. FOSTER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45629, FEDERAL FIREARMS LAWS:
OVERVIEW AND SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS 2 (2019) (“In addition to
expanding the [Federal Firearms Act’s] licensing scheme and categories of prohibited persons—
which largely had been restricted to certain criminals—the GCA augmented the criminal penalties
available for violations and established procedures for obtaining relief from firearm disabilities.”).
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Backlash to the Civil Rights Movement

The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s provided fuel for crimefearing gun control advocates. The narrative of a nation “speeding toward
anarchy” arose, gaining momentum when “major clashes between police
and [B]lack Americans erupted” in the summer of 1964.104 Another wave
of protests washed over the country in the summer of 1967; many of those
protests turned violent.105
In response to widespread police brutality, Black activists began to
advocate for self-defense through firearm possession. A New York protest
spurred by the shooting and killing of James Powell, a Black fifteen-yearold, led a police commissioner to state that he would treat the protest as a
crime problem rather than a social problem, to which Malcolm X
responded, “[t]here are probably more armed Negroes in Harlem than in
any other spot on earth. If the people who are armed get involved in this,
you can bet they’ll really have something on their hands.”106
The Black Panthers107 “adopted [Malcom X’s] perspective on guns as
their own,”108 taking action in ways that “led whites, including
conservative Republicans, to support new gun control.”109 The Black
Panthers began a practice of following the police while armed and
104. CAMPBELL, supra note 43, at 59. It is worth noting that many commentators have expressed
concern around the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests using similar language. See, e.g., Charles Creitz,
Ex-Civil Rights Activist Says Black Lives Matter Using ‘Low-Income Black America . . . to Promote
Insurrection’, FOX NEWS (June 24, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/media/bob-woodson-blacklives-matter-insurrection-anarchy [https://perma.cc/9JA6-JJHJ] (quoting an activist’s claim that
“low-income black America are [sic] being used by the group to promote insurrection in the country,
and anarchy”); Tom Cotton, Opinion, Tom Cotton: Send in the Troops, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/03/opinion/tom-cotton-protests-military.html
[https://perma.cc/W9LF-VAC7] (beginning a piece on the Black Lives Matter protests by announcing
that “Midtown Manhattan descended into lawlessness”).
105. Adam Winkler, The Secret History of Guns, ATLANTIC, Sept. 2011,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/09/the-secret-history-of-guns/308608/
[https://perma.cc/8GMS-B88N].
106. CAMPBELL, supra note 43, at 59 (quoting FRED SHAPIRO & JAMES SULLIVAN, RACE RIOTS:
NEW YORK 1964, at 67 (1964)).
107. The Black Panther Party, founded by Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale in 1966, is a “black
revolutionary party” that began by “[establishing] neighborhood patrols and [protecting] residents
from police brutality.” The Black Panther Party, HOW. UNIV. L. LIBR.,
https://library.law.howard.edu/civilrightshistory/bpp [https://perma.cc/Q73B-XKQK]. It “ultimately
evolved into a Marxist revolutionary group that fought for African American weapon rights,
exemption from ‘white American’ sanctions, and financial compensation for years of racial
exploitation.” Id. The organization also delivered social services, “providing access to medical clinics
and free breakfasts for children.” Id. The Federal Bureau of Investigation “considered the Black
Panthers an enemy of the U.S. government” and “used a combination of sabotage and
misinformation” in its efforts to dismantle it. Id.
108. CAMPBELL, supra note 43, at 65.
109. Winkler, supra note 105.
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shouting out legal advice to Black arrestees as officers were arresting
them.110 Most famously, in 1967, thirty armed Black Panthers climbed the
steps of the California State Capitol building and “announced . . . that
racist legislatures would no longer keep black people disarmed and
powerless” and that “the time had come for [B]lacks to arm
themselves.”111 They then entered the building with their firearms.112
The 1968 report from the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders, commissioned by President Lyndon B. Johnson,113 sheds light
on the federal government’s conflicting reactions to the Civil Rights
Movement. On one hand, the Johnson Administration wanted to address
the protestors’ grievances. The report has been lauded for recognizing
institutional racism,114 as it spent significant time discussing social
programs and other ways of addressing racial inequity. On the other hand,
the report demonstrates a certain anxiety around the protestors’ desire to
disrupt the status quo. The report states that “[the typical rioter] takes great
pride in his race and believes that in some respects Negroes are superior
to whites. . . . He is more likely to be actively engaged in civil rights
efforts, but is extremely distrustful of the political system.”115 Moreover,
the report discussed so-called “legal tools,” a euphemism for criminal
statutes: “A Commission survey of selected police departments revealed
no basic lack of legal tools available to control disorders, but the survey
and other evidence have, however, indicated five other areas where further
legislation may be necessary.”116 According to the report, law
enforcement needed more “legal tools” for controlling firearm use: “The
fact that firearms can readily be acquired is an obviously dangerous factor
in dealing with civil disorders. . . . We therefore support the President’s
call for gun control legislation and urge its prompt enactment.”117
Calls for criminal sanctions may seem out-of-place in a report that, at
least to some extent, meaningfully engaged with the protestors’ demands.
However, white liberals who sympathized with the Civil Rights
Movement often called for gun control in order to reconcile that sympathy
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
CAMPBELL, supra note 43, at 67–68.
Id.
NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIV. DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, at v (1968).
114. See generally Alice George, The 1968 Kerner Commission Got It Right, but Nobody Listened,
SMITHSONIAN MAG.
(Mar. 1,
2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonianinstitution/1968-kerner-commission-got-it-right-nobody-listened-180968318/
[https://perma.cc/77RG-3LGW].
115. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIV. DISORDERS, supra note 113, at 73–74.
116. Id. at 289.
117. Id.
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with beliefs about the inherent criminality of young Black men: “The fear
of ‘the criminal’ . . . a white person on the political left may feel is
intolerable. It cannot fit within the core self-concept of ‘I am a good
person; I am not a racist.’”118 By projecting that fear onto a criminal
object—the firearm—white liberals were able to channel it in a seemingly
neutral way.119
E.

The Birth of the Gun Control Act of 1968

In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson sent Congress a message calling
for “active combat against crime.”120 Noting that the national crime rate
had doubled since 1940,121 President Johnson proposed that Congress
respond by regulating firearms more tightly.122 Two national tragedies
also increased Congress’s willingness to take on gun control: the
assassinations of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 and Senator Robert
F. Kennedy in 1968.123 Finally, in late 1968, the GCA became law.124
Upon signing the GCA, President Johnson announced, “Today we begin
to disarm the criminal and the careless and the insane. All of our people
who are deeply concerned in this country about law and order should hail
this day.”125
As President Johnson’s remarks indicate, one of the GCA’s major
objectives was “[d]enying access to firearms to certain congressionally
defined groups,”126 such as people with felony convictions—who were
(and still are)127 disproportionately Black.128 Mass incarceration, a term
recognizing the United States’ role as “the world’s leading jailer,”129 has
118. Eric Primm, Robert M. Regoli & John D. Hewitt, Race, Fear, and Firearms: The Roles of
Demographics and Guilt Assuagement in the Creation of a Political Partition, 13 J. AFR. AM. STUD.
63, 69–70 (2008).
119. Id. at 70.
120. 1 HARRY L. WILSON, GUN POLITICS IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND MODERN DOCUMENTS IN
CONTEXT 182 (2016).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 187.
123. See Zimring, supra note 98, at 146–47.
124. Id. at 147.
125. WILSON, supra note 120, at 215.
126. Zimring, supra note 98, at 149.
127. Race & Justice News: One-Third of Black Men Have Felony Convictions, SENT’G PROJECT:
RACE & JUST. NEWS (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.sentencingproject.org/news/5593/
[https://perma.cc/BG85-TBN9] (reporting that in 2010, 33% of Black men had a felony conviction,
compared with 13% of all adult men).
128. See Zimring, supra note 98, at 149; Shreefter, supra note 16, at 157.
129. Katherine Beckett & Megan Ming Francis, The Origins of Mass Incarceration: The Racial
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a disparate effect on Black people, who are “5.9 times as likely to be
incarcerated”130 as white people. The beginnings of mass incarceration
emerged during the Civil Rights Movement, and political leaders who
opposed the movement “systematically and strategically linked
opposition to civil rights legislation to calls for law and order.”131 Those
calls for law and order bore fruit with the launch of the War on Drugs, a
collection of policy decisions “that framed drug users . . . as
criminals . . . who deserved only incarceration and punishment.”132 As the
War on Drugs commenced, the United States Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence took a “sharp turn,” making it easier for police
officers to stop and search people with minimal justification.133 For
example, in Terry v. Ohio,134 the Court held that a police officer may
conduct “a reasonable search for weapons . . . where he has reason to
believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual,
regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a
crime.”135 The lack of constraints on officers’ investigatory tactics,
combined with prosecutors’ enormous discretion and the intense
surveillance of people released on probation or parole, contributes to the
disproportionate incarceration of Black people.136 In the mid-1980s, the
number of Black people sent to prison on drug charges almost quadrupled;
by 2000, that number was more than twenty-six times higher than it had
been in 1983.137 During that time, the number of white people sent to
prison rose, too—but only by a factor of eight.138 While the incarceration
Politics of Crime and Punishment in the Post-Civil Rights Era, 16 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 433, 434
(2020).
130. THE SENT’G PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF RACISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION,
XENOPHOBIA, AND RELATED INTOLERANCE 1 (2018) (citing E. ANN CARSON, U.S. BUREAU OF JUST.
STAT., NCJ 251149, PRISONERS IN 2016 (2018)), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/unreport-on-racial-disparities/ [https://perma.cc/9KRZ-SK5P].
131. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 40 (2d ed. 2020).
132. Emily Dufton, The War on Drugs: How President Nixon Tied Addiction to Crime, ATLANTIC
(Mar. 26, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/03/the-war-on-drugs-howpresident-nixon-tied-addiction-to-crime/254319/ [https://perma.cc/6KXP-HJFA].
133. ALEXANDER, supra note 131, at 78–83, 85–87.
134. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
135. Id. at 27 (emphasis added). The Court further held that “in determining whether the officer
acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to
draw from the facts in light of his experience.” Id. (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
174–176 (1949)).
136. ALEXANDER, supra note 131, at 109, 119, 122.
137. Id. at 96.
138. Id.
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rates suggest otherwise, most people who illegally use or sell drugs are
white.139
Relatedly, the importation of cheap handguns—dubbed “Saturday
Night Specials”—was a concern for Congress.140 In congressional
testimony, “[t]he image projected was not just that of a gun but of a gun
and a user class. And the goal implicit in the legislation apparently was to
reduce access to guns for high-risk groups by restricting the supply of
cheap guns, particularly cheap handguns.”141 When the GCA passed,
many Black households were suffering economically: during the 1960s,
the disappearance of high-paying manufacturing jobs combined with
white flight to create “whole urban pockets with high unemployment for
Black men.”142 As a result, restrictions on the importation of cheap
handguns likely had a disparate impact on Black individuals.
Additionally, although the origin of the term “Saturday Night Special” is
not entirely clear, some scholars have contended that it comes from the
phrase “n****r-town Saturday night,”143 which police used to express
indifference toward violence in Black neighborhoods.144 It is hard to
escape the conclusion that legislators—intentionally or not—saw the user
class they wanted to restrict as predominantly Black.
Moreover, the GCA had less of an impact on firearm supply and more
of an impact on firearm convictions.145 The Act caused a shift in the
manpower priorities of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF): the agency quickly devoted more time to firearms
enforcement—with criminal rather than regulatory enforcement taking up
a larger share of that time.146 Likely as a result of this shift, cases
recommended for prosecution by the ATF rose from 375 in 1968 to 3,283

139. Id.
140. Zimring, supra note 98, at 156.
141. Id.
142. Alicia L. Granse, Comment, Gun Control and the Color of the Law, 37 MINN. J.L. & INEQ.
387, 397 (2019); see also Leah Boustan, Opinion, The Culprits Behind White Flight, N.Y. TIMES
(May
15,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/15/opinion/white-flight.html
[https://perma.cc/W5LW-HG8U]; T. Markus Funk, Gun Control and Economic Discrimination: The
Melting-Point Case-in-Point, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 764, 800 (1995) (“[T]he name of this
gun type derived from the racist phrase ‘[n****r-town] Saturday night,’ and the reference is to ‘ghetto
control’ rather than gun control.”).
143. Granse, supra note 142, at 409.
144. Saturday Night Specials, in VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (Ronald Gottesman & Richard Maxwell
Brown eds., 1999) (“A typical and traditional expression of official indifference to shootings and
killings was ‘Oh well, that’s just [n****rtown] Saturday night,’ the implicit message being that those
people’s lives are not worth anything . . . .”).
145. See Zimring, supra note 98, at 154.
146. Id. at 158–59.
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in 1973.147 Indictments rose from 175 to 2,257, and convictions rose from
89 to 1,719.148
II.

GUN CONTROL TODAY: THE RACIST IMPACT OF
18 U.S.C. § 924(C)

Recent data on federal firearm offense convictions shows that Black
people are disproportionately penalized for firearm use and ownership. As
of July 1, 2019, Black people made up 13.4% of the United States
population, and white people made up 60.1%.149 However, in 2019, 53.2%
of people convicted of a federal firearm offense were Black, whereas
25.5% were white.150
Passed as part of the GCA,151 § 924(c) helps maintain this disparity.152
In its modern form, this section states the following:
Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise
provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, any
person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced punishment if
committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device)
for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United
States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any
such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the
punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime . . . be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of
not less than 5 years . . . .153
Black people accused of violating § 924(c) “are much more likely to be
convicted . . . than other groups, are more likely to be convicted of
multiple counts, and are more likely to remain subject to the mandatory
penalties at sentencing.”154 In 2020, 51% of people convicted under
147. Id. at 159.
148. Id.
149. QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/
PST045219 [https://perma.cc/HLZ9-FL97].
150. CHARLES R. BREYER & DANNY C. REEVES, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT
AND
SOURCEBOOK
OF
FEDERAL
SENTENCING
STATISTICS
48
(2019),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-andsourcebooks/2019/2019-Annual-Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y44C-AM4Q].
151. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 102, 82 Stat. 1213, 1224 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
152. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
153. Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
154. Paul J. Hofer, Review of the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Report to Congress: Mandatory
Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 193, 205 (2012).
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§ 924(c) were Black.155
The First Circuit commented on the malleability of the language
criminalizing possession of a firearm “in furtherance of” a drug trafficking
crime: “In most situations, a judge who [instructs the jury] in the terms of
the statute—the ‘in furtherance of’ language—has substantial latitude as
to whether and how to elaborate.”156 Because this language captures a
wide range of activities,157 the statute gives prosecutors significant latitude
in charging individuals with committing the crime.
Prosecutorial discretion contributes to the disproportionate
incarceration of Black people. Professor Angela J. Davis wrote that
prosecutorial discretion “gives prosecutors more power than any other
criminal justice officials, with practically no corresponding accountability
to the public they serve.”158 Prosecutors’ broad and frequently
unreviewable powers are “a major cause of racial inequality in the
criminal justice system.”159 To a great extent, those powers reside in
prosecutors’ “charging and bargaining decisions,” which “are huge
determinants of sanctions”160—especially if a crime carries a mandatory
minimum sentence.161 When a prosecutor charges a defendant with such
a crime, “the defense attorney’s input is virtually irrelevant, and the
judge’s ultimate power to determine the offender’s sentence is greatly, if
not entirely, constrained.”162 Ninety-seven percent of people facing
federal charges plead guilty or nolo contendere (no contest),163 as
prosecutors frequently charge defendants with crimes that carry harsh
sentences for the purpose of getting defendants to plead guilty to lesser
charges.164 “Mandatory minimums . . . provide prosecutors the most

155. Quick Facts: 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) Firearms Offenses, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N,
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quickfacts/Section_924c_FY20.pdf [https://perma.cc/48WF-EF7H].
156. United States v. Felton, 417 F.3d 97, 106 (1st Cir. 2005).
157. See infra section II.B.
158. Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 13, 18 (1998).
159. Id. at 17.
160. Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, What’s Wrong with Sentencing Equality?, 102
VA. L. REV. 1447, 1496–97 (2016).
161. Mary Price, Weaponizing Justice: Mandatory Minimums, the Trial Penalty, and the Purposes
of Punishment, 31 FED. SENT’G REP. 309, 309 (2019) (“In mandatory minimum cases, discretion to
fashion a sentence is removed from the judge and given to the prosecutor.”).
162. Bruce A. Green & Lara Bazelon, Restorative Justice from Prosecutors’ Perspective, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. 2287, 2305 (2020).
163. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ADJUDICATION 9 (3d
ed. 2018).
164. See Price, supra note 161, at 312.
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powerful tool they have to leverage” those pleas.165 When defendants go
to trial and lose, prosecutors then pin the responsibility on them,
contending that they “exercised poor judgment in rejecting the
[offers].”166
In the aggregate, prosecutors do not exercise their charging powers
equitably. Federal prosecutors are twice as likely to charge Black people
with crimes that carry mandatory minimum sentences, compared with
similarly situated white people.167 In particular, a 2009 study found that
Black and Latinx defendants were “disadvantaged in charging decisions”
for federal weapons offenses, suggesting “that prosecutorial reliance on
stereotypical patterned responses is particularly likely when both offender
and offense categorizations feed into common attributions of
dangerousness and culpability.”168
A.

Getting Tougher on Crime: The 1998 Amendment to the GCA

In 1998, in response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Bailey v. United States,169 Congress added language criminalizing firearm
possession “in furtherance of” specific crimes.170 In Bailey, officers who
searched the defendant’s car found thirty grams of cocaine and a round of
ammunition in the passenger compartment.171 They also found a pistol and
“a large amount of cash” in the trunk.172 At trial, the prosecution
introduced expert testimony that “drug dealers frequently carry a firearm
to protect their drugs and money as well as themselves.”173 The jury
convicted the defendant of “‘using’ a firearm during and in relation to a
drug trafficking crime” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).174 However,
the United States Supreme Court held that “evidence of the proximity and
accessibility of a firearm to drugs or drug proceeds” was not enough for a

165. Id. at 310.
166. Id. at 312.
167. NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, BLACK LIVES MATTER: ELIMINATING RACIAL INEQUITY IN THE
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
SYSTEM
16
(2015),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/Black-Lives-Matter.pdf [ https://perma.cc/4S28-WKHH].
168. Lauren O’Neill Shermer & Brian D. Johnson, Criminal Prosecutions: Examining
Prosecutorial Discretion and Charge Reductions in U.S. Federal District Courts, 27 JUST. Q. 394,
421 (2010).
169. 516 U.S. 137 (1995), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112
Stat. 3469.
170. United States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 461 (6th Cir. 2001).
171. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 139.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. (quoting United States v. Bailey, 995 F.2d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
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conviction.175 Rather, the statute required “evidence sufficient to show
an active employment of the firearm by the defendant, a use that makes
the firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense.”176
To arrive at this holding, the Court reversed the District of Columbia
Circuit.177 In doing so, it examined the lower court’s interpretation of the
word “use.”178 The D.C. Circuit had employed an “accessibility and
proximity test,” holding that “one uses a gun” in violation of the statute
“whenever one puts or keeps the gun in a particular place from which one
(or one’s agent) can gain access to it if and when needed to facilitate a
drug crime.”179 The Court criticized that standard, pointing out that it
“provides almost no limitation on the kind of possession that would be
criminalized.”180 By demanding a more rigorous factual basis for the
conviction, Bailey restricted prosecutorial power to charge individuals
with § 924(c) violations.
In response, Congress expanded that power, adding the “in furtherance
of” language to make the statute encompass possession that advanced or
promoted the underlying drug trafficking offense.181 The amendment also
imposed harsher penalties on people convicted under § 924(c),
demonstrating that Congress was motivated by “[getting] tough on
crime.”182
Section 924(c)’s new language gave prosecutors more discretion to
charge defendants and exact more severe sentences. Over the past two
decades, judges have interpreted that language broadly.183 Both
prosecutorial discretion and judicial interpretations of § 924(c) have
aggravated disproportionality in who receives more severe charges and
longer sentences.184

175. Id. at 138, 150.
176. Id. at 143.
177. Id. at 151.
178. Id. at 141.
179. Id. (quoting United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev’d, 516 U.S. 137
(1995)).
180. Id. at 144.
181. United States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 461 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-344,
at 11–12 (1997)).
182. Angela LaBuda Collins, Note, The Latest Amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c): Congressional
Reaction to the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Statute, 48 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 1319, 1325
(1999).
183. See infra text accompanying notes 184–200.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 155–64.
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The Ambiguous Meaning of “in furtherance of”

What does it mean to possess a firearm “in furtherance of” a drug
trafficking crime? That short phrase has “spawned considerable case
law,”185 but it remains ambiguous. For example, it is unclear “whether the
‘in furtherance’ requirement refers to subjective purpose or objective
potential (or whether either would do).”186 In fact, the congressional
committee that first considered the language was unsure if the facts in
Bailey would have been “sufficient to sustain a conviction for possession
of a firearm ‘in furtherance of’ the commission of a drug trafficking
offense.”187
In theory, the language exists to “protect[] public safety” and
“punish[] . . . drug trafficking crimes involving firearms.”188 In practice,
when determining whether a defendant’s conduct meets the elements of
the statute, appellate courts conduct loosely cabined fact-based inquiries
that capture a surprisingly wide range of behavior, much of which has
little to do with dealing drugs.189
When the Supreme Court decided Bailey in 1995, it was wary of the
potential breadth of an accessibility and proximity test as applied to the
element of “use.”190 Nevertheless, since Congress amended § 924(c), the
Ninth Circuit has employed a similar test when interpreting possession “in
furtherance of,” finding that a prosecutor can prove it by showing a nexus
between the firearm and the crime, “determined by examining, inter alia,
the proximity, accessibility, and strategic location of the firearms in
relation to the locus of drug activities.”191
Other circuits’ interpretations also criminalize a broad range of firearmrelated conduct. The plain meaning of “furtherance” is “the act of

185. United States v. Hector, 474 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 2007).
186. United States v. Felton, 417 F.3d 97, 104 (1st Cir. 2005).
187. H.R. REP. NO. 105-344, at 12 (1997).
188. See id. at 14 (describing the U.S. Department of Justice’s reasons for opposing the bill).
189. See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 477 F.3d 607, 613 (8th Cir. 2007) (explaining that if a
defendant asserts on appeal that there is insufficient evidence to support their § 924(c) conviction, the
appellate court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution); infra notes 200–
200.
190. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 13,
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469.
191. United States v. Rios, 449 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added); see also United
States v. Mosley, 465 F.3d 412, 417 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Rios for the same proposition); United
States v. Hector, 474 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. Thongsy, 577 F.3d
1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Hector for the same proposition); United States v. Norwood, 603
F.3d 1063, 1072 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that “the government has provided adequate evidence of a
nexus” if it shows that the gun is in the same room and within easy reach of a sizeable amount of
drugs and trafficking paraphernalia).
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furthering; advancement,”192 and most circuits use some variation of that
definition.193 Additionally, in United States v. Ceballos-Torres,194 the
Fifth Circuit introduced eight non-exclusive factors to “help determine
whether a particular defendant’s possession furthers, advances, or helps
forward a drug trafficking offense.”195 These factors are: (1) the type of
drug activity the defendant is conducting; (2) the firearm’s accessibility;
(3) the type of firearm; (4) whether the firearm is stolen; (5) whether the
possession is legitimate or illegal; (6) whether the firearm is loaded;
(7) proximity to drugs or profits from the sale of drugs; and (8) “the time
and circumstances under which the gun is found.”196 The majority of
circuits now apply these factors.197 The Ninth Circuit has explicitly
rejected them, asserting that it “will not resort to a checklist that has little
relation to the crime charged.”198 The Eighth Circuit has held that just two
factors can be enough: a conviction for possession with intent to distribute
a controlled substance, combined with a conviction for unlawfully
possessing a firearm as a felon.199
To appreciate the practical implications of the circuit courts’ broad
192. United States v. Lopez, 477 F.3d 1110, 1116 n.22 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Furtherance, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 509 (11th ed.
2003)).
193. See United States v. Sparrow, 371 F.3d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he evidence must
demonstrate that possession of the firearm advanced or helped forward a drug trafficking crime.”);
United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 2002) (“We agree with our sister circuits that
adopting this interpretation of ‘furtherance’ is consistent with Congress’ intent in amending
§ 924(c).”); United States v. Suarez, 879 F.3d 626, 632 (5th Cir. 2018) (stating that the government
had to prove that the defendant’s possession of a firearm furthered, advanced, or helped forward the
drug trafficking offense); United States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 460–61 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The term
‘furtherance’ should be understood in its ordinary or natural meaning, which, according to the
dictionary, is ‘a helping forward: advancement, promotion.’” (quoting Furtherance, WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1981)); United States v. Castillo, 406 F.3d 806,
814 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he natural meaning of ‘in furtherance of’ is ‘furthering, advancing or helping
forward.’” (citing United States v. Hamilton, 332 F.3d 1144, 1149 (7th Cir. 2005)); United States v.
Iiland, 254 F.3d 1264, 1274 (10th Cir. 2001) (“No evidence demonstrates that [the defendant’s]
possession furthered, promoted or advanced his illegal drug activity.”); United States v. Timmons,
283 F.3d 1246, 1252 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[A] conviction under § 924(c) requires that the prosecution
establish that the firearm helped, furthered, promoted, or advanced the drug trafficking.”); United
States v. Wahl, 290 F.3d 370, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (listing factors for determining whether possession
furthers, advances, or helps forward a drug trafficking crime).
194. 218 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2000).
195. Id. at 414.
196. Id. at 414–15.
197. See Sparrow, 371 F.3d at 853; Lomax, 293 F.3d at 705; Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462; United
States v. Duran, 407 F.3d 828, 840 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Basham, 268 F.3d 1199, 1206–
08 (10th Cir. 2001); Timmons, 283 F.3d at 1253.
198. United States v. Krouse, 370 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004).
199. United States v. Johnson, 474 F.3d 1044, 1050 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Bell, 477 F.3d
607, 614 (8th Cir. 2007).
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tests, it is helpful to look at examples of the activities they criminalize.
For instance, according to the Ninth Circuit, a person possesses a firearm
in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime by keeping a handgun under a
futon couch in an apartment from which they sell drugs.200 The court
explained that the “apartment was small—less than 700 square feet,” and
“the loaded firearm was located directly on the path [the defendant]
traveled in conducting the drug transactions.”201 According to the Seventh
Circuit, a person possesses a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime by attempting to buy ten kilograms of cocaine while sitting in an
SUV, which has a loaded gun in a compartment that “could be opened
only by following a sequence of steps that would take about half a minute
to complete: start the car, press the defrost button, push down the button
to open a rear window, and place a magnet close to the ignition.”202
According to the First Circuit, a person possesses a firearm in furtherance
of a drug trafficking crime by having an unloaded handgun “in a plastic
bag in a drawer under [a] bed” with the drawer “blocked by a duffel bag,
a trash can, and a box of books,” even if the house contains no
ammunition.203 In each example, the gun was far from readily available,
but the court found that the defendant possessed the firearm in furtherance
of drug trafficking.
C.

Why Defenses Rooted in the Right to Self-Defense Fail

If someone happens to keep a gun in proximity to drug sales, have they
violated § 924(c)? In their published opinions, judges claim that the
answer is no.204 Nevertheless, appellate opinions demonstrate that the
answer is often yes, even where the defendant puts forth a plausible, legal
reason for possessing a firearm.205

200. United States v. Hector, 474 F.3d 1150, 1153, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 2007).
201. Id.
202. United States v. Brown, 724 F.3d 801, 802, 805 (7th Cir. 2013).
203. United States v. Grace, 367 F.3d 29, 31, 36 (1st Cir. 2004).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Krouse, 370 F.3d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Evidence that a
defendant merely possessed a firearm at a drug trafficking crime scene, without proof that the weapon
furthered an independent drug trafficking offense, is insufficient to support a conviction under
§ 924(c).”); United States v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 414 (5th Cir. 2000) (“The ‘mere
presence’ test is one based on generality—anytime a drug dealer possesses a gun, that possession is
in furtherance, because drug dealers generally use guns to protect themselves and their drugs. What
is instead required is evidence more specific to the particular defendant, showing that his or her
possession actually furthered the drug trafficking offense.”); United States v. Wahl, 290 F.3d 370,
375 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Wahl argues correctly that even under the amended statute, the mere presence
of a firearm at the scene of drug trafficking is insufficient to support a conviction under
section 924(c)(1).”).
205. See infra text accompanying notes 224–42.
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The lack of attention to whether defendants have criminal intent is
troubling. There is “a longstanding presumption, traceable to the common
law, that Congress intends to require a defendant to possess a culpable
mental state regarding ‘each of the statutory elements that criminalize
otherwise innocent conduct.’”206 The Supreme Court has applied this
presumption “even when Congress does not specify any [intent] in the
statutory text,”207 and “even where ‘the most grammatical reading of the
statute’” does not support it.208 Some cases interpreting § 924(c) display a
self-conscious recognition of this principle. In United States v. Mann,209 a
rare case where the court vacated the defendants’ § 924(c) convictions,
the Ninth Circuit pointed out that “Congress has not made mere
possession, when it occurs contemporaneously with drug manufacture, a
strict liability crime.”210 Nevertheless, examining the “in furtherance of”
language as applied to the possession element shows that courts do not
meaningfully inquire into defendants’ mental states. While people
accused of possessing firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking crimes
frequently invoke self-defense to explain the guns in their homes, courts
often reject their explanations, even when the main link between the guns
and the drugs is simply proximity.211
This persistent rejection of defenses based on personal protection has
serious implications for Black firearm owners. Personal protection is the
most common justification for owning guns.212 The Supreme Court found
that justification lawful in District of Columbia v. Heller,213 where it held
that people have a constitutional right to possess and use handguns for
self-defense in their homes.214 That right is of special consequence for
Black Americans, who have historically lacked the privilege of relying on
206. Rehaif v. United States, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2195 (2019) (quoting United States v.
X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994)).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 2197 (quoting X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 70).
209. 389 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 2004).
210. Id. at 880. It is worth noting that the defendants were white. Find an Inmate., FED. BUREAU
OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ [https://perma.cc/BQ9A-39GS] (select the “Find by
Name” tab; then type “Tomi Mann” or “James Pollender” into the search bar; then select “Search”).
While the court rejected the prosecution’s argument that the type of gun at issue was “generally
lacking in usefulness except for violent and criminal purposes,” it did not explicitly address the
subjects of hunting, shooting for sport, or self-defense. Mann, 389 F.3d at 880.
211. See infra text accompanying notes 225–44.
212. Ruth Igielnik & Anna Brown, Key Takeaways on Americans’ Views of Guns and Gun
Ownership, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 22, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2017/06/22/key-takeaways-on-americans-views-of-guns-and-gun-ownership/
[https://perma.cc/GP2G-9EDR].
213. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
214. Id. at 636.
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the government for help in the face of danger.215
While the Ku Klux Klan no longer terrorizes Black communities on a
massive scale, today, Black individuals are disproportionately likely to be
victims of violent crime,216 a state of affairs rooted in institutional racism.
Between 1890 and 1970, millions of Black households moved from rural
to urban areas.217 A combination of targeted violence and housing
discrimination led to the concentration of Black families in segregated,
economically under-resourced neighborhoods.218 While much of that
housing discrimination has been outlawed, residential segregation
persists: in 2010, a third of Black metropolitan residents lived under
conditions of hypersegregation, and less than 1% of Black metropolitan
residents lived under conditions of low or no segregation.219 Segregation
and concentrated disadvantage account for high levels of violent crime in
many Black communities.220 A 2010 study found that the average rates of
violent crime in predominantly Black neighborhoods were 327% higher
than in predominantly white neighborhoods.221 A lack of confidence in
law enforcement, the institution that is supposed to provide protection
from violent crime, compounds the problem: 48% of Black people have
very little or no confidence that local police will treat Black and white
people equally, compared with 12% of white people.222 While one could
contend that violence in Black neighborhoods lends support for greater
firearms restrictions, “another, perhaps stronger case can be made that a
society with a dismal record of protecting a people has a dubious claim on
the right to disarm them.”223
To understand how courts brush aside claims of self-defense, it is
helpful to look at specific cases. For example, in United States v.
215. Cottrol et al., supra note 81, at 359.
216. RUTH D. PETERSON, LAUREN J. KRIVO & JOHN HAGAN, DIVERGENT SOCIAL WORLDS:
NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME AND THE RACIAL-SPATIAL DIVIDE 14 (2010).
217. Stephen L. Ross, Understanding Racial Segregation: What Is Known About the Effect of
Housing Discrimination?, in NEIGHBORHOOD AND LIFE CHANCES: HOW PLACE MATTERS IN
MODERN AMERICA 288, 289 (Harriet B. Newburger et al. eds., 2011).
218. See id. at 289–90; Douglas S. Massey, Still the Linchpin: Segregation and Stratification in the
USA, 12 RACE & SOC. PROBS. 1, 1 (2020).
219. Massey, supra note 218, at 3, 8. In 1989, researchers “coined the term ‘hypersegregation’ to
describe metropolitan areas in which [Black people] were highly segregated” on multiple geographic
dimensions. Id. at 4.
220. PETERSON ET AL., supra note 216, at 79.
221. Id.
222. Laura Santhanam, Two-Thirds of Black Americans Don’t Trust the Police to Treat Them
Equally. Most White Americans Do., PBS NEWSHOUR (June 5, 2020, 12:00 PM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/two-thirds-of-black-americans-dont-trust-the-police-to-treatthem-equally-most-white-americans-do [https://perma.cc/2NHT-JQ8L].
223. Cottrol et al., supra note 81, at 361.
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Bryant,224 the Second Circuit upheld a § 924(c) conviction where a Black
defendant225 admitted to selling narcotics and owning a shotgun, but
explained that he had bought the shotgun for protection after a robbery at
his residence.226 In that case, officers searched the defendant’s master
bedroom and recovered a loaded shotgun from underneath the bed, as well
as cash, drugs, and drug paraphernalia from various parts of the room.227
After the search, the defendant gave a statement to the police. He said he
had lived at his residence for about three years, and that he had recently
started selling cocaine for his roommate: “[a]bout a month ago VJ started
selling cocaine out of my house. If VJ is not home and someone wants
some cocaine I will sell that cocaine. Two months after I moved in I was
robbed. That is why I have a shotgun.”228 The defendant’s ownership of
the shotgun was legal, and there was no evidence of him brandishing or
discharging the firearm in public.229 Moreover, as his statement makes
clear, he bought it several years before he began selling narcotics from his
residence.230
The defendant challenged § 924(c) as unconstitutional because it
“burdened his . . . right to keep and bear arms in defense of his own
home.”231 The court, while acknowledging the “‘core lawful purpose’ of
self-defense,” rejected this challenge.232 It held that “once Bryant engaged
in ‘an illegal home business,’ he was no longer a law-abiding citizen using
the firearm for a lawful purpose, and his conviction for possession of a
firearm under these circumstances does not burden his Second
Amendment right to bear arms.”233
Another Second Circuit case illustrates the ways courts treat § 924(c)
defendants who invoke the right to self-defense. In United States v.
Lewter,234 the court upheld a § 924(c) conviction where officers found
drugs and cash in the defendant’s dresser and a pistol under his bed.235 As
224. 711 F.3d 364 (2d Cir. 2013).
225. See Find an Inmate., FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/
[https://perma.cc/BQ9A-39GS] (select the “Find by Name” tab; then type “Ron Bryant” into the
search bar; then select “Search”).
226. Bryant, 711 F.3d at 367.
227. Id. at 366.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 367.
230. Id. at 367–68.
231. Id. at 365.
232. Id. at 370 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008)).
233. Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 555 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir.
2009)).
234. 402 F.3d 319 (2d Cir. 2005).
235. Id. at 321.
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in Bryant, the defendant was Black.236 He argued that there was
insufficient evidence that he possessed a firearm in furtherance of drug
trafficking.237 He asserted that he did not sell drugs inside his residence,
he lived in a tough neighborhood, and the jury had no basis for choosing
between the possibility that his possession furthered his illegal activities
and the possibility that his possession was for personal safety.238
Testimony at trial established that the area immediately around the
apartment was “particularly dangerous,” and that “the problems were so
severe that there had been a video surveillance system set up to monitor
it.”239
However, the court held “[t]he evidence was sufficient to support the
jury’s verdict that [the defendant] possessed the gun to defend his drug
stash.”240 First, the court defined “in furtherance of” broadly: “‘[I]n
furtherance’ means that the gun afforded some advantage (actual or
potential, real or contingent) relevant to the vicissitudes of drug
trafficking.”241 Next, the court pointed to the following facts: the
defendant stored the pistol within feet of his stash and within his reach;
the firearm appeared to have an obliterated serial number, which is illegal;
and the pistol “was loaded with hollow-point bullets.”242 The court then
reasoned that the latter two factors “militate against an inference of
innocent use, such as target practice or hunting.”243 Moreover, it added
that “possession for personal protection does not preclude possession in
furtherance of a drug trafficking offense,” and that here, “the person to be
protected was a drug dealer, and among the things being protected were a
saleable quantity of drugs.”244
By contrast, courts faced with § 924(c) cases readily accept hunting,
target shooting, and collecting guns as examples of lawful reasons for
owning firearms.245 Unlike self-defense, these activities are largely
associated with white communities. The United States Fish and Wildlife
Service conducted a national survey in 2016 and found that 97% of
236. See Find an Inmate., FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/
[https://perma.cc/BQ9A-39GS] (select the “Find by Name” tab; then type “Coleridge Lewter” into
the search bar; then select “Search”).
237. Lewter, 402 F.3d at 321–22.
238. Id.
239. Brief and Special Appendix for Defendant-Appellant at 9–10, Lewter, 402 F.3d 319 (No. 042546-CR).
240. Lewter, 402 F.3d at 322.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 323.
245. See infra text accompanying notes 249–52.
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hunters were white.246 A 2008 study found that 87% of active sport
shooters were white.247 According to one 2006 study, the typical gun
collector is a white, married man over the age of forty.248 And a 2009
ethnographic study found that “Guns Don’t Kill People It’s Those Dang
Angry Minorities” was a popular t-shirt slogan in the gun-collecting
community.249
Courts have explicitly stated that these activities—hunting, target
shooting, and gun collection—make firearm possession by people
engaged in drug trafficking justifiable. In United States v. Mackey,250 the
Sixth Circuit listed factors that would help “distinguish possession in
furtherance of a crime from innocent possession of a wall-mounted
antique or an unloaded hunting rifle locked in a cupboard.”251 Several
other circuit courts have quoted that language.252 In Ceballos-Torres, the
Fifth Circuit noted that “a drug trafficker who engages in target shooting
or in hunting game” will be unlikely to violate § 924(c) “by keeping a
pistol for that purpose that is otherwise locked and inaccessible.”253 In
United States v. Thongsy,254 the Ninth Circuit held that an instructional
error in a § 924(c) case was harmless, noting that a Drug Enforcement
Administration Agent testified that the defendant’s firearm “would not be
used for hunting.”255 Even Congress seemed to consider white-coded
activities when it amended the statute in 1998. For example, one
representative expressed concern that under the statute, a hunter who
possessed a hunting rifle and a small amount of drugs could face

246. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 2016 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FISHING, HUNTING, AND
WILDLIFE-ASSOCIATED RECREATION 33 (2018), https://www.fws.gov/wsfrprograms/subpages/
nationalsurvey/nat_survey2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X73-AGKZ].
247. RESPONSIVE MGMT. & NAT’L SHOOTING SPORTS FOUND., THE FUTURE OF HUNTING AND THE
SHOOTING SPORTS: RESEARCH-BASED RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION STRATEGIES 32 (2008),
https://responsivemanagement.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Future_Hunting_Shooting_
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JRF-E3SJ].
248. Leon Anderson & Jimmy D. Taylor, Standing Out While Fitting in: Serious Leisure Identities
and Aligning Actions Among Skydivers and Gun Collectors, 39 J. CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 34, 39
(2010).
249. JIMMY D. TAYLOR, AMERICAN GUN CULTURE: COLLECTORS, SHOWS, AND THE STORY OF THE
GUN 122 (2009).
250. 265 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 2001).
251. Id. at 462.
252. See United States v. Castillo, 406 F.3d 806, 815 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Sparrow,
371 F.3d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 2004).
253. United States v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 2000).
254. 577 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2009).
255. Id. at 1043.
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punishment.256
In sum, federal courts interpret § 924(c) in ways that increase Black
defendants’ vulnerability to incarceration and disarmament. First, the
interpretations encourage prosecutorial discretion, a major contributor to
racially disparate outcomes in the criminal legal system. Second, the
interpretations penalize defendants who invoke the right to self-defense
while shielding defendants who own guns for recreation. Because
structural racism renders Black people more vulnerable to violence, and
because recreational gun users are overwhelmingly white, these
interpretations disadvantage Black defendants who choose to go to trial
rather than simply pleading guilty. As a source of harm for Black firearm
owners, § 924(c) requires a closer look.
III. INCREMENTALIST AND ABOLITIONIST APPROACHES TO
CHANGE
The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street
Journal all wrote about 2020 as a period of racial reckoning.257 As we
grapple with institutional racism, we must take care not to leave anyone
behind—including people accused of dealing drugs.
This Comment proposes two different ways to address § 924(c)’s
disparate impact on Black people, one incrementalist and one abolitionist.
First, to reduce the unstructured discretion that penalizes Black
defendants, courts should require a criminal scienter258 connection
between firearm possession and drug trafficking. Alternatively, to
eliminate that unstructured discretion entirely, Congress should repeal the
language in § 924(c) that criminalizes possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.

256. Collins, supra note 182, at 1353 n.217 (citing 144 CONG. REC. H533 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1998)
(statement of Rep. Maxine Waters)).
257. See John Eligon & Audra D. S. Burch, After a Summer of Racial Reckoning, Race Is on the
Ballot, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/30/us/racial-justiceelections.html [https://perma.cc/L3RP-2SD4]; Paul Farhi & Sarah Ellison, Ignited by Public Protests,
American Newsrooms Are Having Their Own Racial Reckoning, WASH. POST (June 13, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/media/ignited-by-public-protests-american-newsroomsare-having-their-own-racial-reckoning/2020/06/12/be622bce-a995-11ea-94d2d7bc43b26bf9_story.html [https://perma.cc/SV8E-FJVJ]; Pamela Newkirk, After 2020, How Do We
Move Forward on Race?, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2020, 11:00 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/after-2020-how-do-we-move-forward-on-race-11607961601
[https://perma.cc/U9J9-TN9E].
258. Black’s Law Dictionary defines scienter as a “degree of knowledge that makes a person legally
responsible for the consequences of his or her act or omission; the fact of an act’s having been done
knowingly, esp. as a ground for civil damages or criminal punishment.” Scienter, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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The Incrementalist Approach: Applying the Presumption of
Scienter to § 924(c)

Applied to the element of possession, the phrase “in furtherance of”
allows for a broad interpretation of the statute, one that encourages the
disproportionate criminalization of firearm ownership by Black people
and members of other marginalized groups. Firearm possession is a
passive act, and “in furtherance of” does little to limit the context in which
such possession breaks the law.
At the very least, courts should prevent possession of a firearm in
furtherance of drug trafficking from becoming a de facto strict-liability
crime259 by interpreting § 924(c)(1)(A) more narrowly. Courts should
require prosecutors to prove a genuine connection between the firearm
and the drug-trafficking activity. Doing so would limit prosecutors’
discretion to charge defendants under § 924(c) and thus reduce the
potential for racially disparate outcomes.
When determining whether a defendant possessed a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, a court should not ask whether,
objectively, the firearm had the potential to further drug trafficking.
Rather, the court should put itself in the defendant’s shoes and ask
whether, subjectively, the defendant possessed the firearm for the purpose
of furthering the specific drug trafficking crime the prosecution claims
took place. Because this inquiry would require the court to delve into the
defendant’s subjective reasons for possessing the gun, it would make it
likelier that a defendant convicted of violating § 924(c) truly intended to
use the gun to advance or promote the drug trafficking crime at issue in
the case. It would also make it harder for courts to brush aside defendants’
assertion of the right, reaffirmed by Heller, to possess a firearm in one’s
home for protection—a right the United States has a history of denying
Black Americans.
Under a subjective standard, the defendant in Bryant would have likely
faced a different outcome. The court would not have been able to
announce that the defendant “was no longer a law-abiding citizen using
the firearm for a lawful purpose” simply because he dealt drugs.260 Rather,
the prosecution would have had to affirmatively prove that the defendant
possessed the shotgun with the intention of using it to promote his drug
trafficking activities. The record does not show that the defendant’s
roommate talked with him about using the shotgun to protect the drugs. It
259. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a strict-liability crime as an “offense for which the action
alone is enough to warrant a conviction, with no need to prove a mental state.” Crime, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
260. United States v. Bryant, 711 F.3d 364, 370 (2d Cir. 2013).
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does not show that any of the defendant’s buyers saw the shotgun or even
knew of its existence. It merely shows that the shotgun was in the same
room as the drugs, paraphernalia, and cash. Given that the defendant told
officers that he bought the shotgun for self-defense well before he began
selling cocaine, the prosecution would have had to tie ownership of the
firearm to drug trafficking much more rigorously to secure a conviction.
While Lewter presents a closer case, the outcome might have been
different under a subjective standard. In Lewter, officers found drugs,
cash, and a pistol in the defendant’s apartment. Mr. Lewter argued that
there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that he possessed a gun
to further drug trafficking rather than to protect himself from the dangers
of his neighborhood. Using the test proposed here, the court would not
have been able to hold that a person possesses a firearm in furtherance of
drug trafficking if the gun only affords “some advantage (actual or
potential, real or contingent) relevant to the vicissitudes” of selling
drugs.261 Under this definition, a person violates § 924(c) whenever their
gun could have helped them sell drugs, regardless of whether they
intended to use the gun for that purpose.
Moreover, the Lewter court’s point that “the person to be protected was
a drug dealer”262 would be irrelevant. The fact that a person both owns a
gun and sells drugs does not, standing alone, show intent to use the gun to
further the sale of drugs. Courts have repeatedly recognized this fact by
noting that a drug dealer can own a hunting rifle or an antique firearm
without violating § 924(c).263 They should explicitly extend that reasoning
to drug dealers’ ownership of firearms for self-defense. Trafficking
controlled substances may not be a lawful occupation, but it is ultimately
something a person does for money. It is not an identity or an immutable
characteristic. A person who meets their financial obligations in this way
is no less deserving of protection from neighborhood violence than a
person who has never so much as jaywalked.
Unfortunately, a subjective standard likely would not have helped Mr.
Bell, whose story appears in the Introduction. Officers said they saw Mr.
Bell reach for a gun while crack cocaine belonging to him sat nearby. The
record lacks information about why Mr. Bell purchased the gun, or why
he kept it at his partner’s home. While there is room to argue that trying
to grab a gun when strangers barge into one’s bedroom is consistent with
self-defense, a jury would be entitled to find that Mr. Bell was attempting
to use the gun to defend the drugs. Mr. Bell’s case demonstrates the limits

261. United States v. Lewter, 402 F.3d 319, 321–22 (2d Cir. 2005).
262. Id. at 323.
263. See supra section II.C.
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of reinterpreting statutory language that Congress designed to put more
people in prison.
B.

The Abolitionist Approach: Amending § 924(c)

When Congress amended § 924(c) in 1998, the tough-on-crime
approach to reducing violence was in full swing.264 Today, political
leaders question the wisdom of that approach. President Joe Biden, who
once “spearheaded many of the laws” that “fueled a population explosion
in federal prisons,”265 campaigned on a platform of reducing
incarceration.266 Two House Representatives have backed the BREATHE
Act267: written by Black Lives Matter activists, the bill proposes to defund
“large swaths of the federal law enforcement apparatus,” eliminate
mandatory minimum sentences, and begin working toward the
abolishment of prisons.268 A bill that drastically shrinks the scope of the
criminal legal system would have been unthinkable just a few years ago,
but a June 2021 poll showed that the BREATHE Act is popular among
likely voters.269 Given this shift in thinking around what it means to keep
communities safe, the time is ripe to revisit the GCA. Congress should
remove the language in § 924(c) that punishes possession of a firearm in
furtherance of drug trafficking.
Eliminating this language is not a particularly radical step. Even if
Congress were to decriminalize possessing a firearm in furtherance of
drug trafficking, federal prosecutors would still have the power to charge
individuals for using or carrying firearms “during and in relation to
any . . . drug trafficking crime.”270 For example, a person would still break

264. Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern
Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 831 (2000) (“The percentage of the population incarcerated, the
length of sentences imposed, and the number of offenses which carried automatic prison sentences
regardless of mitigating circumstances all increased drastically during a relatively short period of
time.”).
265. German Lopez, Biden’s Secret Weapon for Criminal Justice Reform, VOX (Feb. 26, 2021,
12:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/2021/2/26/22303071/biden-clemency-pardon-criminal-justicereform-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/5UNK-NMCT].
266. The Biden Plan for Strengthening America’s Commitment to Justice, BIDEN HARRIS,
https://joebiden.com/Justice/ [https://perma.cc/3C2R-QLPM].
267. H.R. 585, 116th Cong. (2019).
268. Sean Collins, Now Is the Time to Revolutionize Policing, VOX (Feb. 22, 2021, 8:00 AM),
https://www.vox.com/22263084/breathe-act-revolutionize-policing-pressley-tlaib
[https://perma.cc/T7TM-EBLR].
269. Li Zhou, This Progressive Police Reform Bill Is Pretty Popular, VOX (June 21, 2021, 8:30
AM), https://www.vox.com/2021/6/21/22535672/breathe-act-progressive-police-reform-bill
[https://perma.cc/KTQ3-YUJP].
270. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
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the law by putting a gun on display during a drug transaction.271 Moreover,
trafficking drugs would continue to be a standalone crime—one that
carries its own mandatory minimums, depending on factors like the types
and quantities of drugs involved.272 Far from wiping all gun crimes off the
books, this reform would simply erase a provision of § 924(c) that carries
great potential for abuse. Without the provision, prosecutors would have
far less power to coerce firearm owners during plea bargaining, and
appellate judges would have a harder time upholding convictions where
defendants legitimately asserted the right to self-defense.
By getting rid of a powerful charging tool, this reform would constitute
a small but meaningful step toward addressing racial disparities in the
enforcement of federal firearm laws. It would also give the government
one less way to punish Black Americans for exercising their Second
Amendment rights.
CONCLUSION
The firearm is a potent symbol of political power. To the English
colonizers, the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafters, and the Black Panthers
alike, guns represented self-determination. Having a gun meant having the
ability to protect oneself, be it from a tyrannical government bent on
maintaining the status quo, a Klansman bent on terrorizing people of
color, or a police officer bent on carrying out an arrest by any means
necessary. Given the firearm’s symbolic significance, it is important to
notice who gets to own guns and who does not, regardless of one’s
opinions about the proper role of weapons in an industrialized society.
While the GCA appears racially neutral, its origins and impact
demonstrate that, under the guise of disarming criminals, it unjustly
disarms Black Americans. Greater prosecutorial discretion leads to
greater disparities in the charging and incarceration of Black people. By
giving prosecutors the power to charge an individual with a crime
whenever they keep a gun near their drugs—even if they possess as few
as seven grams, a quantity arguably consistent with personal use—
§ 924(c) leads to the excessive criminalization of Black firearm owners.
In amending § 924(c) after Bailey, Congress expressed its intention to
fight crime, but that intention must be balanced with the need to refrain
from punishing people who lack culpable mental states. It must also be
balanced with the need to question laws that disparately impact
271. See Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 13,
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469 (amending § 924(c) to criminalize possession of a firearm
“in furtherance of” drug trafficking).
272. 21 U.S.C. § 841.
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marginalized groups.
Courts can bring a small measure of balance to the GCA by requiring
prosecutors to establish a criminal scienter connection between the
possession of a firearm and the trafficking of drugs. Congress can go
further by amending § 924(c) to eliminate the vaguely defined crime of
possessing a firearm “in furtherance of” drug trafficking. In comparison
with the scope of the criminal legal system, these reforms are narrow.
Nevertheless, either would have a meaningful impact on the lives of
individuals—particularly Black individuals—accused of violating
§ 924(c).

